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ABSTRACT: Culture can be approached from an existential semiotic point of view in many ways. The 
following results can be then obtained: The new notion which the Existential semiotic theory of culture 
(ESC) tries to launch is transcendence. The ESC theory is an attempt to see and analyse issues from the 
inside, using a model called Zemic which refers to four modes of Being. It deals with agency like any 
cultural theory, but now behind the theory is the idea of a subject as a transcendental ego, who is capable 
of pursuing acts, making choices and enjoying freedom. The theory of ESC can be tested by empirical 
cases of cultural life and history such as studies in cultural heritage. The theory is non-deterministic. 
There is “linguistic turn” in the sense that a new metalanguage is elaborated to deal with transcultural, 
supra-rational and metacultural issues. Formal language is used to some extent, stemming from the 
semiotic square, deontic logic and the grammar of modalities. The proper philosophical style is that of 
the continental and speculative theory, yet the ESC theory is not any regress in the history of philosophy. 
ESC theory is non-reductionist, i.e. it emphasizes the phenomena as such.
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Is an existential semiotic theory of culture possible? Such 
a question came to my mind when reading recent studies and books on British 
cultural theory. This theory, which seems to have become dom inant in many 
fields of social sciences and humanities and which represents to me those theories 
belonging to the “nothing but...” category, is almost unavoidable in the academic 
world nowadays. It is taken as a given. No one seems to be aware of its inherent 
cultural imperialism, which favours the contemporary, globalized, technosemiotic, 
market-, media- and consumption-oriented culture which is expanding over the 
whole world. It is at the same time a way of relativizing all other alternative views 
of cultures and all different approaches to these issues. The culture emerging from 
this new “cultural theory” is nothing but an ideological version of the present 
world civilization. That remains the case even if we were to admit that culture can, 
after all, be a transcendental issue, since often the ideas, identities etc. to which 
it constantly refers, are absent, transcendental entities which in spite of this ex­
ercise a strong emotional appeal and have power over people’s minds. However, 
transcendence is totally relativized in just the same way as it was by sociology and 
history during the sociosemiotic phase of our societies. Communities in which we 
live are to a great deal imagined, just as Benedict Anderson tries to show. Does it 
mean that they are “transcendental’?
Yet the major question about cultures, when they become objects of scientific 
research and discussion, is whether there could exist a meta-cultural theory 
which would be more than an ideological reflection of one culture, albeit the victori­
ous one. A hope of such a theory would seem to be the only possibility of avoiding 
those “cross-cultural misunderstandings” which Walburga von Raffler-Engel once 
discussed. To discover or elaborate such a theory is a challenge indeed for the 
concept of transcendence itself and its explanatory power for the mundane affairs 
of our Dasein. However, taking into account such an issue as transcendence does 
not mean a shift to, for example, theology. Societies which seem to try to function 
upon the transcendental principle, i.e. varieties of religion, have often proved to 
be inefficient over a longer period. Thus, in order to obtain an existential semiotic 
theory of culture, it is not sufficient to apply only the idea of transcendence. One 
needs other aspects as well, such as seeing the situation from within, and follow­
ing the ethical principle of the subject’s ability to make choices and thus influence 
his/her fate in the world. Any such theory which denies this subjective point of 
view is certainly not existential. The cold and inhuman theories of structuralism, 
like Michel Foucault’s, are deterministic in this sense. There is something life­
less, extremely pessimistic and passive in those theories regarding man - who is, 
however, a political and active animal; such a creature as he appears in, among 
others, the writings of Hanna Arendt. She describes her subject as fighting against 
the dictatorship of conditions (a term also used by the Finnish philosopher Georg 
Henry v Wright), and for the “infinitely improbable”, which can be achieved in 
spite of everything. The Foucaultian vision of society evokes La Mettrie’s idea of 
I’homme machine — or Jean Cocteau’s machine infernale, a cruel game played with 
humans by the Gods. The existential semiotic view is never like that; it always gets 
into the skin of the protagonists of human history, its agents — and these agents 
can be anyone, not only in the Heideggerian negative sense of das Man — but any 
subject in his/her existential situations.
When lecturing recently on the theme What is Existential Semiotics at 
the Finnish Science Society in Helsinki, I was asked by my colleague, professor of 
translation theory Andrew Chesterman: “Are there any means to test your theory, 
or to forecast or predict something with it?” I said to him: “you are very British” 
— which was not intended to be an argumentum ad hominem, but to raise the 
eternal question whether philosophical theories in the humanities can be tested, 
or even need testing, by experiments or empirical facts; I wanted to point out that 
the truth criteria in these issues might be different from the traditional correspond­
ence theory with its word-thing issues, being based instead on the coherence of the 
new model of reading facts, a new conceptual metalanguage. Then our discussion 
continued and my colleague put aside the idea of testing and put his criticism in 
another way: “Can you imagine any evidence which would show your theory is 
wrong?” Here I distinguished a Peircean undertone of fallibilism, i.e. that scien­
tific theories are characterized by their constant renewal when they are shown to 
be erroneous and that progress, if any, in science, was based precisely upon this. 
However, the hypothesis from which I start myself is that conceptual and philo­
sophical theories are almost always nothing but absolutizations of the personal 
life experiences of the scholar. If this were true, to say that a theory is wrong would 
mean: a) your experience has been wrong, or b) the m anner you inferred your 
theory from your experiences, i.e. your reasoning, has been wrong. The first point 
would be truly tricky: how could you say to anyone that your experience, your life 
history, growing into a person, into an identity and into a profession from a mere 
physical body, was wrong? To claim such a thing would mean to undervalue and 
even be contemptuous of a person and of subjectivity. Yet, there are standpoints 
which do this. Marxists say: you represent falsches Bewusstsein  and therefore 
your ideas are wrong. Psychoanalysts say: you are neurotic, that is why what you 
say does not tell us what you really are; according to the Lacanian principle, your 
signifiers do not reflect your true signifieds; feminists and gender theoreticians say: 
you represent a repressive chauvinist ideology, a patriarchal order; accordingly, 
your standpoint is conditioned by your gender position and cannot represent any 
ultimate truth, nor even any authenticity. However, I have to leave this debate so 
as not to stray from the subject. The other point of view, i.e. my theory is wrong 
due to erroneous reasoning, is closer to the “normal” evaluation in science and 
humanities. A theory is wrong or right depending on whether it represents his 
intuition for the scholar and whether he is able to express and communicate it to 
other members of the scientific community.
However, let us also take the idea of testing a theory seriously to the extent 
that we could try to find out what kinds of cultural, psychological and social phe­
nomena could be understood and explained by applying to them the existential 
semiotic viewpoint. Taking into account the huge quantity of mankind’s cultural 
experiences, what we call “traces of hum anity” (I remember Jaroslav Jiranek 
saying so), we might try to interpret them by applying our existential theory and 
asking whether it functions as a cultural theory or not. Pursuing this line I would 
propose that we could use the international research project Semiotics o f  cultural 
heritages, with its approximately 60 young and more advanced scholars all over 
the world, as the empirical field where we could apply our theory. However, be­
fore doing so we should define what our existential theory is in this respect, and 
which elements of it are relevant here. In the semiotic tradition, we may ask how 
the other cultural theories have succeeded in progressing along the same line or 
digressing from it in other directions. We need to ask whether we can use the 
existential theory to criticize or approve the already existing cultural theories 
in semiotics, from Lévi-Strauss, Foucault and Barthes to Eco, Ponzio and even 
Nietzsche, Bakhtin, Benedict, Stuart Hall, Valsiner, Deleuze, Münster, Schütz, 
and many others.
The theory in brief
Clearly, the reader should know in advance something about the existen­
tial theory. However, it would not be necessary to read all my books on the subject;1 
it is enough to summarize some essentials. As in TV soap operas, the 19th century 
newspaper feuilleton novels, or Wagner’s Nibelungen Ring, one has to learn what 
happened in the previous part. The theory concerns our Dasein, or the living world 
with all its subjects and objects. But the area b ey o n d  the Dasein is involved just 
as much, and that is called transcendence. What it is, is still quite open. The easiest 
definition I have discovered is: the transcendent is anything which is absent but is 
present in our minds. Modern man might think that it is something like virtuality, 
virtual space, some might even say that it is the internet of our time but that would 
be going too far! As to the structure of our Dasein, so far I have arrived at a model 
which is called Zemic. It consists of four modes of Being which have been arranged 
to form a square. The logical square itself was invented by ancient stoic philoso­
phers. The Paris school of semiotics took it up again in the 1960s and called it the 
“semiotic square” with terms si, s2, not-s2 and not-sl. This was used to articulate 
four modes of being stemming from the Hegelian logic: from an-sich-sein to fiir- 
sich sein (being-in-oneself/being-for-oneself); in turn, this model was adopted by 
Jean-Paul Sartre in his existentialist philosophy (L’Être et le néant). Then, borrow­
ing from these sources, I added from the semiotic theory of the body (soma/sema) 
by Jacques Fontanille, and from the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, the categories of 
M oi/Soi. Accordingly we have four cases of Moi/Soi, Ml, M2, S2 and SI. They cor­
respond to the body, to identity (person), to social practices and to social norms 
and values. Each one marks its own Greimassian modality, in the same order: will, 
can, know and must. Thus the last modality, that of “believe,” has been reserved 
for transcendence which can become present and actualized at any time via acts of 
negation and affirmation.
Such a model has not been previously presented in semiotics, but in the his­
tory of philosophy I recently found, in the work of an Arabian-Persian Sufi mystic 
Ibn Arabi (full name Muhyi al-Dim Ibn Arabi, 1165-1240), an analogous model of 
circles of transcendence, also surrounding the four modes of Being. Ibn Arabi was 
born in Murcia, in Spain, but after long journeys finally settled at Damas in Syria. 
His model portrays six circles of transcendence: 1) the divine presence (outermost 
circle); 2) the second circle showing the place of Man; 3) the third circle represent­
ing the presence of the divine in man (similar to what we observe in the Platonic 
ideas) 4) this shows Man in contact with the world; 5) the axis cutting the inner
1 Eero Tarasti, Existential Semiotics, (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2000); Fondements de la sémiotique existentielle, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009); ’Existential se­
miotics in culture and psychology” in Jaan Valsiner (ed.), Oxford Encyclopedia o f Culture and 
Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Sein und Schein. Explorations in Existential 
Semiotics, (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, forthcoming 2014).
circle into four parts represents multiplicity (the categories of existing things) in 
the World; and 6) the circle in the middle represents the World of which Man is 
master and its support. The four areas starting from the center towards periphery 
are separations among the diverse categories of the existing things in the World.
Transculturality
By showing this amazing parallel I simply want to emphasise that the 
existential semiotic cultural theory should be able to discuss such cases across 
cultural and historical borderlines, and develop reading models and concepts of 
such high universality that even phenomena as extremely remote from each other 
as Hegelian logic and Sufi mystics can find a common denominator. That would 
be true transculturality and “multiplicity” (see later Deleuze).
There would thus be two parts to this task: first — a historical overview of 
semiotic theories, including those which we do not regard as overtly semiotic in 
spite of their use of semiotic notions, and often ignoring their origins in the various 
contexts of European semiotics, as in the case of British cultural theory. The second 
task is to consider how existential theory would, as a theory, meet the challenge of 
the global ethical situation in which we find ourselves now, in our technosemiotic 
state, having not yet, hopefully, forgotten the earlier socio- and ethnosemiotic liv­
ing worlds. For a long time semiotics has been looking for ways of answering the 
essential and vital questions of mankind, not only by being subordinated to the 
service of the capitalist consumer world and economic profit, but by pondering on 
a non-utilitarian basis the essence of such imminent problems of world cultures as 
Umwelt, a non-violent society, human responsibility, growth, education and cultural 
identity. The existential theory, by launching such difficult concepts as transcend­
ence, the Zemic model, new categories of signs, Schein, post-colonial analysis, the 
theory of resistance and modalities, attempts to offer a promise in this direction. 
It is a comforting fact that often the most abstract theories prove to be the most 
practical and have the most pragmatic consequences when facing empirical reality.
For brevity’s sake, the existential semiotic cultural theory will from now on be 
referred to as the ESC theoiy. So, the ESC theory cannot be a generalisation and 
an absolutisation of any particular culture or society. Yet, even this is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, Ruth Benedict warned about this as early as her classical work 
Patterns o f  Culture.2 In the chapter Study o f m anners she states that a social 
scholar gathers a large quantity of material for a treatise on learning, on narcis­
sism as the origin of neuroses, but deals with only this material. In other words: 
he/she does not care about social systems and cultures other than his/her own.
2 Ruth Benedict, Kulttuurin muodot (orig. Patterns o f Culture), trans Kai Kaila (Helsinki: 
Porvoo, 1951).
He/she identifies, for example, local Westerns attitudes with human nature and 
calls their description “Economy” or “Psychology”.
Yet this happens very often, and did happen in earlier times with speculative 
theories of the human mind. However, we should not rej ect such theories out of hand, 
since they might contain something similar to what Lévi-Strauss called, in a neo- 
Kantian manner, “categories of the human mind” (categories de l’esprit humain).
Criticism of British cultural studies
Let us consider briefly the modern cultural theory course books used 
in all universities nowadays. First, let us take the book by Chris Barker, Cultural 
Studies: Theory and Practice.3 In its foreword Paul Willis says: “At an everyday 
and human level, cultural interests, pursuits and identities have never been more 
important”. Individuals and groups want [...] “something more than passive or 
unconscious acceptance of a historically/socially prescribed identity (simply being 
working class, black or white, young or old etc). Everyone wants to have or make or 
be considered as possessing cultural significance”. This sounds rather “existential” 
and promising. Yet, it is not specified here who that “everyone” is, which I am afraid 
is very similar to the Heideggerian “average person”, das Man of the contemporary 
global marketing culture. After a long list of “possible cultures”, from interpersonal 
interactions to group norms, communicative forms, texts and images to institutional 
constraints, social imagery and economic political determinants, the author says: 
“We are condemned to a kind of eclecticism because of the very eclecticism and 
indissoluble combinations of the dissimilar in the increasingly complex “real” world 
around us”.4 But what is “real’? This was precisely the theme of a major semiotic 
congress in Ankara, Cankaya University organized by the architect Zeynep Onur. 
It is exactly the present technosemiotic global consumption world and nothing else 
which is absolutized here as the “World as such”. I have elsewhere posed this ques­
tion from the standpoint of an emancipated subject: do we want to be part of that 
world? In fact this is already quite Hegelian. “Real” equals to wirklich, and Hegel 
said: w as vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich, und w as wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig. 
So the logic of this world is taken as universally true. However, let us remember what 
the Austrian writer Robert Musil said in his Der Man ohne Eigenschaften: Wenn 
es Wirklichkeitssinn g ib t muss es auch Möglichkeitssinn geben. There is nothing 
determined about reality or the world, there are always alternatives, possibilities.
Even Willis speaks about the “postdisciplinary” nature of cultural studies. 
Instead of writing endlessly “introduction to... that and that”, they are a privileged 
site for the emergence of the discipline of disciplines. He is impressed by how Chris 
Barker deals with topics such as world disorder, sex, subjectivity, space, cultural
3 Chris Barker, Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice (Los Angeles, London: Sage, 2008).
4 Paul Willis, in Barker, Cultural, xxii.
policy, identity, youth culture, television, ethnicity, race... which reveal “...some 
concrete grounds of a complex and rapidly changing “real” world... and these sites 
are presented in selected theoretical contexts. In one word: he aims for a supra- 
disciplinary base”.5 It is certainly the case that the ESC theory shares the same 
goal, but not on such an eclectic basis. Barker sees all cultural forms as structured 
like language - how familiar that sounds! That was the thesis of the structuralists 
a long time ago. However, how is such a supra- or meta- or fundamental deep 
level of reflection to be reached? Jaan Valsiner discusses this in terms of cultural 
psychology.6 He has a diagram which, in cross-cultural psychological terms, “gen­
erates” the culture top-down, from humankind to particular societies A, B etc, to 
social institutions within the society, to individual persons. This model is then 
corrected and replaced by another, in which culture “belongs to” an individual, 
in this model the participation is first analyzed by using samples which exemplify 
the psychological systems of these individuals. The theory is then tested on other 
individuals and so forth. Ultimately, one may attain a general theory of human­
kind and its cultures.7 This means that such a meta-level is reached inductively, by 
studying a sufficient number of “cases” of human cultures. The existential theory 
is certainly close to this kind of “psychologizing” of anthropological theories; 
however, it is not a psychological theory as such, but rather a conceptual one. We 
shall soon see in what way.
Language games
In what follows, I shall purposely juxtapose the cultural theory and 
ESC theory, so that the latter’s distinguishing features are foregrounded. The 
purpose is not to engage in polemics for their own sake, but simply to situate 
the new theory among other existing theories, and to state, at the least, what it is 
NOT. To criticize another theory by listing all that it is lacking would be the most 
primitive kind of scientific debate and should be avoided, since no theory can take 
everything into account.
Barker says in his opening: “I explore that version of cultural studies which 
places language at its heart”. He gives greater attention to poststructuralist theories 
of language than to “the ethnography of lived experience”.8
Barker then argues that: “Cultural studies does not speak with one voice...” but 
as early as in the next phrase he admits that his whole theory draws on work “de­
veloped in Britain, United States, Continental Europe (most notably France) and
5 Ibid., xxiii.
6 Jaan Valsiner, Culture in Minds and Societies. Foundations o f Cultural Psychology. (Los 
Angeles, London etc.: Sage 2007).
7 Ibid., 28.
8 Barker, Cultural, 3.
Australia”.9 He admits: it would be more accurate to describe this text as Western 
cultural studies. “I simply do not feel qualified to say how much cultural studies as 
I understand it, is pertinent to the social and cultural conditions of Africa”.10 What 
follows throughout the whole book then clearly demonstrates that, true, certain 
French authors are accepted but they appear as individual geniuses, totally de­
tached from their original ideas, historical roots and contexts. We all know how the 
American book markets are always “discovering” a genius from Paris, which is full 
of such talents only waiting to be discovered by managers; his/her output is quickly 
translated into American, he/she is turned into a new intellectual fashion icon—just 
as it happened with Foucault, Derrida, Barthes etc. etc.: the list is endless. Barker 
admits that Africa is outside his context, but where is Asia, Latin America, Russia 
etc? This is exactly what Benedict warned about: a theory is valid only within one 
limited area and culture — although now expanded as a new civilization via globali­
zation to every corner of the world. But the imperialist purport of such enterprise is 
immediately clear. Such a totally Anglo-centric theory can never be the ESC theoiy!
Furthermore Barker remarks: “Cultural studies is constituted by the language 
game of cultural studies”.11 Is this then the famous “linguistic turn”, the same as in 
Anglo-analytic philosophy? The ESC theory admits the importance of metalanguage 
to deal with different cultures, but that is another issue. The claim is then made 
about cultural studies as politics, in that the subject is important for its explora­
tion and representation of marginalized social groups and the need for cultural 
change. The author then talks boldly about the production of meaning in language 
as signifying practices. How can this be claimed without a semiotic theory?
Moreover, the author states that “Cultural studies has for the most part been 
concerned with modern industrialized economies and media cultures along capi­
talist lines”.12 He thus tries to combine these signifying practices with political 
economy. He certainly takes the present economic system as a given; Signifying 
practices have to be adapted to it. He then argues that cultural studies are non­
reductionist. Yet nothing is said about the culture itself. The same often holds true 
for communication studies, which investigate only h o w  something is communi­
cated, and not w h a t is communicated.
Articulation
Then comes the notion of “articulation”. It means the formation of 
a temporary unity between elements that do not have to be combined. Strange! 
It is certainly true that articulation stems from linguistics and refers to levels of
9 Ibid., 4.
10 Ibid., 9.
11 Ibid, 4.
12 Ibid, 9.
articulation, the 1st and 2nd articulation in semiotics as defined by André Martinet 
(see also Eco). Nothing is said about its origin. In the chapter titled Power cultural 
studies are said to be concerned with subordinate groups. What groups? The next 
chapter, on popular culture, reveals that popular cultures are obviously thought 
to be subordinate. This idea also appears elsewhere. For instance, popular music 
is regarded as being in a minority position, although it holds all the power in the 
market and what is now subordinated and threatened is undoubtedly classical 
music, as well as all of high culture in general (Roger Scruton being the only scholar 
with the courage to defend it in his book M odern Culture).13
We then have the notion of the “hegemonic” text. Since images, sounds, ob­
jects and practices are sign systems which signify with the same mechanism as 
a language, we may refer to them as cultural texts. The distinction between verbal 
and non-verbal is totally omitted. Naturally, this evokes the Lotmanian theory of 
culture as texts. Text is there generalized to concern any cultural object or activ­
ity. A difficult point might arise when a scholar turns to an intra-textual world of 
objects without temporality (like painting or architecture). Texts, being faithful 
to their linguistic origin, normally have a beginning and an end. Why not replace 
this term by the notion of narrativity and narrative?
Next comes the issue of subjectivity. This is involved as a part of consumption, 
i.e. we exist as subjects only as consumers. “The moment of consumption marks 
one of the processes by which we are formed as persons. How we are produced 
as subjects”.14 The author does not ask: how do we m a k e  ourselves? Identities 
are discursive constructions, we then learn. We have to study the class basis of 
a culture that aims to give voice to the subordinated... but, again, who are they, 
those imagined “subordinated’? We then move on to structuralism, with only 
three authors named: Saussure, Lévi-Strauss and Barthes. Lévi-Strauss is intro­
duced via Edmund Leach — we all know how superficial that is — and it is said 
of him: “Typical of Lévi-Strauss structuralism is his approach to food, which, he 
declares, is not so much good to eat as good to think with”.15 About structural­
ism, we are told that it is “synchronic in approach analyzing the structures of 
relations in a snapshot of a particular moment”. This sounds totally mysterious. 
Moreover, “structuralism is best approached as a method of analysis rather than 
an all-embracing philosophy”.
Postmodernism is supposed to claim: “knowledge is not metaphysical, tran­
scendental or universal but specific to particular times and spaces”. Here transcend­
ence is obviously misunderstood, transcendence is not “there”, somewhere high 
up, but it is here, where we have actualized it in our Dasein, as is proposed by the 
ESC theory. Later on, more is said about subjectivity and identity, in the chapter
13 Roger Scruton, Modern Culture (London: Continuum, 2000).
14 Barker, Cultural, 11.
15 Ibid., 17.
on personhood as a cultural production. What it means to be a person is social and 
cultural “all the way down”. Identities are wholly social constructions and cannot 
exist outside cultural representations... but later it is admitted: “...identity is an 
essence that can be signified through signs of taste, beliefs, attitudes and lifestyles. 
Identity is deemed to be both personal and social’16 — i.e. according to our theory 
both M2 and S2. It is then suggested that “There are no transcendental or ahis- 
torical elements to what it means to be a person”.17 Thus the theory denies totally 
the concept of a “transcendental ego” behind our constructed social “egos”. Yet if 
this is so, how is it possible that we can read texts that are a thousand years old 
as if they were written yesterday? Moreover, the book claims that what it is to be 
a person cannot be universal. Psychoanalysis is to be read as a set of poetic, meta­
phorical and mythological stories. It cannot be the basis of a universal theory.18 In 
the chapter Language and identity we read that one cannot have an “I” and one 
cannot have an identity. Rather one is constituted through languages. Language 
does not express an already existent “true self’ but brings the self into being.19 But 
then we can ask: do we exist only when we are talking?
Later on it becomes clear that articulation here means something totally differ­
ent from its original meaning in linguistics. Following the interpretation used here, 
it applies, rather, to human development in general, as Kierkegaard used it once 
in his famous Stages o f  life (orig. Stadier a flive t), which were aesthetic, ethical 
and religious. We could then say that they are levels with different articulations 
which always take place when we move from one “subject position” to another. 
There is thus no organic growth from one to another, as Goethe presumed. This 
provides man with the freedom to rearticulate himself again when shifting to 
a new level. Applying this to our Zemic model, a move from Ml to M2 and further 
to S2 can also mean a rearticulation of one’s inner semiotic mechanisms, modali­
ties. If one is clumsy, slow, weak, inadequate in Ml, one may suddenly become, 
with determination, like another person in M2, and even change one’s Ml profile 
by training; one can even have this happen in order to reach a degree of S2. Well, 
Richard Wagner never became an S2 actor, although he wanted it as M2 - because 
as Ml he was too short and his voice was unclear. Demosthenes stuttered in Ml 
but became a great orator in S2. The ballet dancer Jorm a Uotinen was almost 
paralyzed in Ml in his youth by a rare illness, but became a famous dancer in S2. 
Other examples could be given. Oscar Parland has portrayed this kind of event 
in his novels: a new “person” or mode of being can emerge like a butterfly from 
caterpillar, as a metamorphosis.
16 Ibid, 216.
17 Ibid, 218.
18 Ibid, 223.
19 Ibid, 225.
Subject positions
In modern theory we might say that the “subject position” changes. 
As Barker puts it, “Thus the same person is able to shift across subject positions 
according to circumstances”.20 But behind this argument is the very postmodern 
statement that “No single identity can... act as an overarching organizing identity... 
We are constituted by fractured multiple identities”. This is the favourite idea of 
many contemporary thinkers who deny the possibility of a transcendental ego. 
Naturally, if there is a transcendental ego, the person is not a new subject on the 
same level as others, but functions from another logical position altogether. Yet 
this is what has just been denied above. In our framework, does the subject posi­
tion mean adopting one of the modes of being Ml, M2 S2 or SI, and staying in it? 
This is certainly an error, since if you classify people according to one mode, you 
forget that everyone is always a combination of all four of them. Identities are 
better described as certain constellations of these modes with different empha­
ses among them. In one identity, Ml is important, let us say, for a member of an 
athletic club, while for another the SI mode is the most essential, as in the life of 
a saint in a desert, or a martyr. Therefore, if you classify a person according to the 
categories “fat/thin”, you dwell in Ml, but maybe the person considers himself 
more in terms of M2, i.e. “cheerful/serious’? Yet, if subjects are regarded as idiots 
who do not know what happens within them — as structuralists are always claim­
ing — someone else is making their discourse and thus subordinating them. So 
the emic aspect is totally lacking here.
What Foucault said
Nevertheless, it is interesting in itself to raise the problem of what is 
described as the “agency”, and the politics of identity. This is linked to the theories 
of Foucault. It has been said that, for him, subjects are discursive constructions and 
products of power. But he has been criticized for not providing us with a theory of 
agency.21 For him, ethics are concerned with practical advice as to how one should 
concern oneself with oneself in everyday life. He speaks about the “techniques 
of the self’. Ethics center on the government of others and the government of 
oneself. Ethical discourses construct subject positions which enable agency to oc­
cur. Agency is a discursive construction exemplifying the productive character of 
power, according to what Baker supposes Foucault has said. Yet, such an ethical 
standpoint is close to the utilitarian ethics. Ethics exist to improve the welfare of 
subjects. This ignores a very essential aspect of ethics, which is that, most often,
20 Ibid., 231.
21 Ibid., 232.
to follow an ethical principle and to carry out an ethical act does not lead to any 
advantage, profit or promotion of the agent’s own life, but rather the reverse. 
A person who does good things is hated by others, and ultimately destroyed. Why? 
Because to do good means that one is stronger than others. This is something most 
people cannot accept. Yet, we might say that doing good makes evil manifest itself, 
and when evil is visible, observable, it is easier to fight against. In any case, the 
ethical principle is a much deeper mental capacity than mere reflection of SI and 
S2 in one’s mind, i.e. coming from the outside, from the Soi. It is already in Moi, 
or rather it is in every mode, and particularly as a transcendental, virtual value 
waiting for its actualization. Thev, the director of the Great Encyclopedic Center 
of Islamic Studies, has said in Teheran, at the opening of a symposium on ethics, 
that it is more important than religion. Good is good, and bad is bad universally, 
for all human beings. Such a conception of ethics goes indeed much deeper than 
the Western theories of it often do.
However, what Foucault actually said was that he denied the existence of such 
a thing as a transcendental ego. He argues in The Order o f  Things (orig. Les mots 
et les choses): “If there is one approach that I do reject, however, it is that (one 
might call it broadly speaking the phenomenological approach), which gives abso­
lute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, 
which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity, which, in short, 
leads to a transcendental consciousness”.22 Thus he seems to deny the whole idea 
of agency and claims, as Barker puts it: social systems operate to structure what 
an actor is. However, the concept of ethics centered around the care of the self is 
an extremely limited view.
It is true that there is something pessimistic and gloomy in the Foucaultian view 
of man. Famous and often quoted is the passage from the above-mentioned treatise: 
“Strangely enough, man — the study of man — supposed by the naïve to be the oldest 
investigation since Socrates — is probably no more than a kind of rift in the order 
of things, or, in any case, a configuration whose outlines are determined by the new 
position he has so recently taken in the field of knowledge [...] It is comforting and 
a source of profound relief to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure 
not yet two centuries old.... that he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge 
has discovered a new form”.23 It goes without saying that such a standpoint could 
never be acceptable in the ESC theory. Yet, the Foucaultian archaeology project has 
a heuristic value in revealing a general space of knowledge, its configurations and 
the mode of being of the things that appear in it; all this defines “[...] systems of 
simultaneity as well as mutation sufficient to circumscribe the threshold of a new 
positivity”.24 Clearly, this is the aim of an existential metatheory of cultures as well,
22 Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things. An Archaeology o f the Human Sciences, trans A.M. 
Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), xiv.
23 Ibid., xxiii.
24 Ibid., xxiii.
in regard of the level of profundity. Foucault does not seem to notice that by saying 
that, he is positioning himself as a scholar in the role of a transcendental ego whom 
he wanted to remove from his scholarly discourse altogether. What Menard Boss 
said about scientific pre-understanding holds true here quite well.
If Foucault disliked the idea of transcendence, so also did Lévi-Strauss who 
ten years before Foucault said the same in his Structures o f  E lem entary Parent­
hood25 in the acclaimed chapter on “archaic illusion”. Yet, he did so with agency as 
it is understood in cultural theory: freedom, free will, action, creativity, original­
ity and possibility of change through actions of free agents. Against these theses 
Barker proposes that subjects are determined by social forces that lie outside of 
themselves as individuals. He says that a great many actions of modern life are 
routine in character. Often we do not make self-conscious choices at all, but follow 
a socially determined routinized path. This is also the claim made by Umberto Eco 
when he talks of the automatism of the codes which force us to do certain things. 
Yet, for Barker “the best we can do is to produce another story about ourselves”, 
even though “we clearly have the existential experience in facing and making 
choices”.26 However, the existence of social structures (S2) is not only negative: it 
also enables us to realize our actions. Thus, according to Barker, human freedom 
cannot consist of an escape from social determinants.
Action
We might then ask whether the ESC theory is a theoiy of pragmatic 
action? If the ESC theory essentially deals with the change and transformation of 
culture, the logic of act and event fits well with its essence, following Georg Henrik 
v. Wright. Is a shift from one mode to another an act or an event? Does it occur by 
itself or only by purposeful intentional act? Acts are not changes in the world as 
such. They are not events. But many acts are portrayed as causing changes. To act 
means, in a sense, to intervene in the course of nature. Yet, an event is a shift from
1) one state to another (for instance a window is opened); 2) from a state to a series 
of events (for instance to start running); 3) from a series of events to a state (for 
instance to stop talking); or 4) changes in series of events (for instance: a walk­
ing man starts to run). One has to distinguish the act categories — for instance to 
perform music — and an individual act — to perform Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony. 
The logical difference between acts and events is in their activity and passivity. An 
act needs an agent. An individual event means that a general event takes place in 
a particular situation. An individual act is to perform a general act in a particular 
situation and through a particular agent.
25 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté (Paris: PUF, 1949).
26 Barker, Cultural, 236.
We can now already apply this kind of analysis and ask whether in our exis­
tential model changes, i.e. shifts from one mode to another, from Ml to M2, from 
body to person etc., are acts or events? It is an event when, for instance, a body 
grows and becomes a person, but it is an act when a certain body decides to adopt 
certain habits and thus becomes a person. Thus a change from M2 to S2 means: 
a certain person becomes a certain kind of professional, let us say in the family 
of Habsburgs they all become kings and queens at a certain moment; in certain 
societies certain types of persons automatically take up certain positions, such 
as warriors, priests, governors, following Dumezil’s Indoeuropean model. But if 
particular persons decide to take up particular professions as their choice, their 
decision and effort to reach these positions in S2, then these are acts. Moreover, in 
v. Wright’s theory one distinguishes acts and events, and then activities — series 
of events or processes. Events take place, but processes just go on. So by applying 
the Wrightian logic of change we can analyse the growth of a culture, how a culture 
becomes a culture.
Moreover, we may ask: if Ml and M2 still represent the biological and S2 
and SI the social levels, how does the shift from nature to culture take place? Is 
it the Rousseauian narrative of the kind “all is good in nature and becomes bad 
in culture’? Yet we may suppose that the movement in the Zemic model is partly 
automatic, i.e. caused by events, and partly caused by acts. But in both cases the 
logical operations of affirmation and negation have their role. Forbearance is 
a kind of negation. An agent forbears in a certain situation from doing a certain 
thing, if and only if he could do it but in fact does not do it. If we then go on to 
establish norms, there are three types of them: something should be done — an 
order; something is allowed to be done — a permission, something is not allowed 
to be done - a prohibition. Thus, if we know the modes beginning from SI — the 
social norms and values — and they have these statuses, the first two, SI and S2, 
launch the chain from SI up to Ml, but the third one, M2, can stop it. But even 
then, this forbearance can have certain consequences which, again, have their 
impact on the course of events. Is the movement within the Zemic model the same 
as the temporal course, i.e. the duration of one individual’s life and the history in 
the life of collectivities?
The model could be formalized here: “should” = M l —»—► - M2, “allow” = 
Ml...—»M2 (i.e. M2 is permitted after Ml), and “forbidden” = Ml — ►/— >M2. 
Furthermore, we can ask whether the movements are the same in both directions, 
from Ml to SI and from SI to Ml.
There is already so much use of formal schemes that we may return to the ques­
tion of whether in fact ESC is close to Anglo-analytical philosophy. The use of formal 
languages was one of its criteria. However, if we think of the origins of the model, it 
was the logical square on four terms si, s2, not-sl and not-s2, once used by ancient 
logicians. With A. J. Greimas it became the semiotic square. In the ESC it became 
the Zemic model. If we accept this as an approval of formal logic we have already
satisfied two criteria; the first one was the linguistic turn — which, however, in the 
ESC theory received a somewhat different interpretation. The third criterion still 
remains: is this the correct philosophical style? This is the hardest criterion, since 
a theory which also stems from Hegel, that “conceptual poetry”, as one semiotician 
said contemptuously, and which uses the notion of transcendence which others 
hate, certainly could not meet the challenge of achieving the correct philosophical 
style in the Anglo-analytical sense. However, let us keep on trying to use our Zemic 
model and its explanatory power for another presentation of a cultural theory.
Cultivating
Michael Ryan has published another course book, Cultural studies. 
A Practical Introduction.27 It has the following chapters which by their titles al­
ready reveal all that belongs to the field of cultural theory: 1) Policy and industry,
2) Place, space and Geography, 3) Gender and Sexuality, 4) Ideologies, 5) Rheto­
ric, 6) Ethnicity, 7) Identity, Lifestyle, and Subculture, 8) Consumer culture and 
Fashion studies, 9) Music, 10) Media studies, 11) Visual culture, 12) Audience, 
Performance and Celebrity, 13) Bodies and things, 14) Transnationality, Globaliza­
tion and Postcoloniality. The book begins as follows: “The word culture has always 
had multiple meanings. In one sense of the word, culture is inseparable from 
human life. Everything from how we dress to what we eat, from how we speak to 
what we think, is culture. You only notice this really when you change and enter 
another culture” ...’’Culture becomes visible when we travel between “cultures’”.28 
Let me note at this point another new British book about culture, namely Roger 
Scruton’s M odern Culture. He refers to Herder, who defines Kultur as the life­
blood of a people, the flow of moral energy that holds society intact. Zivilisation  
by contrast consists of manners, laws and technical know-how. Nations may share 
a civilization but they will always be distinct in their culture, since culture defines 
what they are. So reasons Scruton.291 have already dealt elsewhere with the Kultur/ 
Zivilisation distinction in my essay on Resistance30 where globalization appeared 
as a new type of civilization, conquering all geographical spaces and places and 
destroying local cultures. Culture here is the essence of a nation. Yet another theory 
emphasizes its Latin etymology, namely the process and activity of cultivating 
something. Here we meet Wilhelm Humboldt and his famous Bildung, finely 
translated into English by Scruton: “cultivation” (not education, formation and so 
on). For Herder, culture, i.e. SI, constitutes practices and beliefs — S2 — creating
27 Michael Ryan, Cultural Studies. A Practical Introduction (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010).
28 Ibid., viii.
29 Scruton, Modem, 1.
30 Tarasti, Sein und Schein.
the self-identity, or M2, of a tribe. Thus, it penetrates all the modes of the Zemic 
model! But then Scruton is almost the only author who dares to mention the idea 
of high culture versus common culture. When British cultural theory emerged, 
strongly influenced by the views of Raymond Williams, it was a rebellion against 
the elitist tradition; as Scruton says, alongside the elite culture of the upper class, 
there has been another culture, by no means of less value, of people who affirmed 
their solidarity in the face of oppression and through which they expressed their 
identity and a sense of belonging.31 This is exactly the case of Nancy Mitford’s 
famous distinction between two languages: Upper class or U-language and Non 
Upper class i.e. non-U language (for instance in low culture you say: “greens”, in 
upper class language you should say “salad’; in low culture one says: “What?”, in 
high culture one should say instead: “I beg your pardon?”). This is certainly true.
In all of semiotics and its expansion in the 1960s there was always present this 
cultural trait: one could deal with the low culture phenomena in academic discourse 
by semiotic formal analysis, its rigorous method made it acceptable and legitimate 
in that sphere; whereas when the same approach was directed towards the high 
culture phenomena, they were regarded as alienated and distanced from their 
origins, a view which became politically acceptable in the often leftist intellectual 
semioticians” communities. The success of Roland Barthes was to a large extent 
based on this. However, the idea of culture as something elevated, something to 
be reached, a kind of goal for life aspiration, from Ml to M2 via S2 to SI, was the 
idea behind all of arts education — and why not education as a whole? Namely, if 
you adapt yourself to sociological relativism, you have only behaviours of equal 
value. In particular when you observe a society from the outside. From the inside, 
within the Zemic model, it looks different. Certain values become manifest only 
when one believes in them and follows them in one’s activities. This explains why 
adherents of high culture claim that they, and not the others, represent the true 
values of a culture. They are right in this emic aspect.
We should thus distinguish between culture as a Zemic entity, i.e. in its inner 
aspect, and culture as a Zetic object, i.e. in its external aspect. Culture as a collec­
tion of cultural objects, culture as signs represents, of course, the Zetic view. The 
author then says: culture means conformity with the reigning standards, n o rms 
and rules — which is what we mean by SI. If culture means embedded norms, then 
norms are learned as one grows up — this means the gradual shift from Ml to SI. 
This means that culture consists of, on the one hand, practices in which we engage, 
norms by which we live in S2 and SI in the Zemic aspect, and cultural artifacts, 
signs, texts etc. or S2, SI, as the Zetic aspect, or outer entities. To make a musi­
cal recording one must not only have talent, i.e. the Zemic M2 and S2, but also 
a production company, i.e. the Zetic S2. Culture in the sense of artistic objects is 
possible only if culture in the first sense, as a way of life, gives permission, argues
31 Scruton, Modern, 3.
Dr. Ryan. Thus the Zemic and the Zetic are in constant interaction and fluctua­
tion. Yet, there is a creative aspect in culture on the normative side. Avant-garde 
art questions norms and thus yields a creatively dissonant collision. In fact, in our 
Zemic model, transformed into a narrative model of text analysis, we encounter 
such collisions among all the four modes or levels.32 Since that is the case, Ryan’s 
idea of certain cultural forms being victimized is very strange. Who is victimized 
by whom and where, after all?
We may now have enough material to claim that ESC theory is certainly n o t  
the same as British cultural theory. Indeed, it tries to go beyond such kind of 
“ideological” science which stems directly from a particular type of society, albeit 
a triumphantly victorious one. British cultural theory is altogether an ideological 
variant of the globalized market culture without alternatives. Yet it has presented 
some categories which are of interest, since, even when developing the ESC theory, 
we live in the 21st century and not in 18th" or 19th century Europe.
Content and Speculation
We have not said anything so far about the content of our existential 
theory of culture, i.e. what kind of image or view of culture it offers? Is culture 
something organic, something like an organism? This metaphor was once strongly 
promoted by Oswald Spengler and of course a long time before him by Goethe. 
Spengler writes: “Culture and the spirituality of great historic organisms differ 
from each other by habitus. The habitus of existence consists of a higher offer of 
all cultures, the manifestation of all life [...] there appears a style of a certain soul. 
Habitus includes a certain life span and tempo of development. The concept of 
life time of a man, butterfly and oak contain in spite of accidents of fate, a certain 
value. Similarly, every culture and period, rise and fall have their given duration 
expressed by a symbol”.33 Certainly “habitus” here is not the same as for Bourdieu. 
Spengler utilizes such notions as the soul and symbol and talks of the Apollonian, 
Faustian magic symbols of the ancient Greek, Western culture, as well as of Arabian, 
Chinese primal symbols, art works as living wholes... I would not be surprised at 
Professor Chesterman preceding this speculation with his question: is there any 
evidence which would show that these ideas are wrong? Spengler fits well with 
youthful minds, and so I may quote myself from my notebook from 1967 (writ­
ten in Vienna): “Sometimes it seems as if we are living in a world of two cultures: 
one is the authentic Faustian one (to please Spengler!) which is to a great extent
32 See my study on Robert Schumann’s Fantasy C major op. 17 in Tarasti, Semiotics of 
Classical Music: How Mozart, Brahms and Wagner Talk to us (Berlin -  Boston: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2012).
33 Oswald Spengler, Lansimaiden perikato. Maailmanhistorian morfologian aariviivoja, 
trans. Yrjo Massa (Helsinki: Kiijayhtyma, 1963), 98.
national, or let us say European — and the other one is the culture of technics 
and mathematics, one of “numbers”, which is international. That could be called 
a machine culture”.
Furthermore, we can of course ask whether ESC theory is a speculative theory, 
such as those produced in German philosophy beginning from the 18th century. 
If we dare to quote Hegel in semiotics, we certainly have to answer this question. 
Hegel aimed for a complete explanation of being. He adopted the Kantian idea of 
categories but for him the number of categories was limitless, and together they 
formed the absolute, the whole reality. Hegel’s philosophy was metaphysical or 
objective idealism. The objective reality is the absolute spirit. Things are concepts, 
such as we can know. Knowing is Einfiihlung to the thing and its possession by 
thought. Thus Reason creates the world. Aristotelian logic operates with genus 
plus differentia. In Hegel the opposition of a concept is already contained in the 
concept itself: Sein — Nichts - Werden. Criticism of Hegel claims that without 
a particular speculative conviction his logic is not accessible. The absolute nature 
of his dialectics and certainty are based on the feeling of subjective certainty, not 
on objective facts. Therefore it is irrational by nature. To put it less bluntly, we 
might rather say that his aim was a kind of supra-rationalism. The subject he is 
talking about is not the same as the real, physical, psychological subject, Professor 
Hegel lecturing in Berlin. It is a construction, or what is called a transcendental 
ego, as Sartre and others referred to it later. Or we could take his philosophy as 
a narrative in which the implied philosopher or author is not the same as the real 
person (how this fits together with what Menard Boos said about the origin of any 
scientific thought is of course a problem). Hegel is said to represent the last at­
tempt to concentrate on the constructive problems of ideas. He believes in thoughts 
and ideas as forces making world history, and therefore having great pragmatic 
import. If we accept the idea of a “system” in Hegel in our ESC theory we might as 
well accept its connection with praxis — albeit some say those consequences were 
disastrous for mankind.
The organism
There are many ideas of a speculative nature the relevance of which 
to the ESC theory needs to be examined, such as the idea of an organism. If we 
think of culture as Growth, as in the idea of Bildung, the metaphor is certainly 
striking. It means that culture is, if not reduced back to, then at least thought to 
stem from — nature. The whole Levi-Straussian problem with the shift from na­
ture to culture was with finding rules of a universal nature. It is typical of nature 
that it can give only what it has received, whereas in culture an individual always 
receives more than he gives and gives more than he receives. The exchange was 
called by Marcel Mauss “fa it  total social”, and mutual communication was one
such universal rule where culture emerges from nature. In the chapter Archaic 
illusion Lévi-Strauss mentions three universal rules: the existence of rules, the 
concept of mutual exchange between the self and others as the mediation of this 
opposition, and the synthetic nature of a gift, i.e. the transfer of value from one 
individual to another, creating a relationship between these individuals and adding 
a new quality to the value. This is what Bakhtin said later about the basic nature 
of dialogue. This is certainly very important in our Esc theory, which so far is 
based upon the inner structure of one subject only. The idea of an organism, for 
instance in the biosemiotics of Uexküll, originates from the German speculative 
organism philosophy and Kantianism, namely the idea of exchange between an 
organism and Umwelt, which is filtered by Merken und Wirken and by Ich Ton of 
the organism. Yet in Lévi-Strauss the idea of an organism is strange. The manner 
in which Lévi-Strauss portrays the Nambikwara society and its leadership is close 
to the Durkheimian idea of organic solidarity. “Personal prestige and the ability to 
inspire confidence are the basis of power in Manbikwara society”.34 From this the 
Finnish scholar Tuomas Kuronen, in his study of political leadership in Finland, 
drew the conclusion that the same model applies in Western culture: “Cultural 
layers, especially those built upon Western educational and conceptual institutions 
are privileged in the way Western people make sense of their world. They... are 
taken as granted, in a similar way the Nambikwara would take theirs”.35 What is 
behind such an analogy is certainly the idea of culture as a kind of organic entity, 
also present in the idea of Bildung.
In archaic culture the tribal structure shows features of such an organic nature 
as semio-anthropologist Jean Claude Mbarga has shown in his recent study of the 
Cameroonian culture and identity. Mbarga portrays a culture and society in which 
tribalism, clannism and sectarianism are dominant and make a real religion of 
everyday life. His approach is existential in the sense that it is not reductionist in 
any structural way but takes into account the life situation of every Cameroonian 
person. Yet, behind it are always the aforementioned big questions of the possible 
organicity of his culture, and analogies with Western culture. I once saw on TV 
a programme in which quite young African boys from Nigeria, 8 years old, spoke 
while fishing about how life was in the West. Their reasoning was amazingly wise, 
mature and right — from their point of view, albeit it dealt with an issue which for 
them was so transcendental.
The lesson from all this is that we can successfully apply the idea of organicity 
in so far as it does not become a reductionist model in which the primal, phenom­
enal, felt, lived-in realities are explained away by some abstract categories. Thus 
ESC theory is definitely anti-reductionist.
34 Tuomas Kuronen, Ritual in Constructing Strategic Leadership Mythologies (Doctoral 
dissertation. Helsinki: Aalto University, 2011), 1.
35 Ibid.
Generation
However, the idea of organicity can take more sophisticated forms in 
various theoretical models going under the rubric of semiotics. For instance, the 
so-called generative models, no longer so “fashionable,” are like that. Repeating 
the earlier question about what culture looks like in an autopsy, one answer is 
that it is a multi-level organic process in which deep, unconscious structures yield 
the more superficial manifest structures. This is the Chomskyan tree model. Is all 
culture like that?
The temptation to apply this model has always been there, and, among others, 
the Greimassian parcours génératif was supposed to be like that. However, the 
model taken to the extreme, as in the work by the theater scholar Kari Saloaari, 
has turned out to be over-rational, awkward theoretizing in which we launch 
a huge system in order to explain one cultural detail. Yet the heuristic value of 
such a model remains, since we have to find an organization and a structure for 
our semiotic observations. But I would hardly imagine that a generative model of 
Iranian culture or Cameroonian society were reasonable enterprises. Moreover, 
generativism can be seen in philosophy, as well in the Heideggerian system, where 
all is derived from the fundamental “Being”. Ontological semiotics can easily fall 
into the trap of such generativism, albeit all the evidence might show that reality 
is much more unpredictable and complicated, sometimes attaining the limits of 
irrationality. Rather, the idea of levels of articulation would save our system of 
multi-level culture from such over-rationalisations i.e. by admitting that a new 
articulation is possible at any level of culture.
Nature *
Anyway, the idea of organic processes stems from the concept of nature. 
Even Greimas had the notion of le monde naturel but there is nothing natural 
about it; it was, rather, nature as opposed to culture but already completely semi- 
otized. I have dealt with this problem elsewhere. However, the historian of ideas, 
Arthur Lovejoy, once made a list of what “nature” as a concept contained, finding 
19 different cases of nature; in fact, all cultural concepts: 1) nature as objects to be 
imitated by art; 2) nature as empirical reality; 3) human nature, i.e. ordinary hu­
man behaviour with its passions; 4) connections among facts, cause and effect seen 
as natural; 5) nature as a Platonic idea which is realized incompletely as empirical 
reality; 6) nature as general type excluding particular traits of species; 7) nature 
as average or statistical type; 8) nature as antithetic to man as his works, i.e. that 
part of empirical reality to be touched by human art (= culture, we could add here); 
9) “nature” as a system of evident truths, of properties of essences; 10) intuitively 
felt as principles of taste or standards as statements on what is objectively and
essentially beautiful; 11) nature as cosmic order, whole or half personified (my­
thologized) force, natura naturans; 12) such attributes as uniformity, simplicity, 
economic use of means, regularity, nature as geometrizing, irregularity, savagery, 
completeness, the richness of and manifoldness of content; 13) continuous de­
velopment; 14) naturality as a quality of an artist; 15) self expression without self 
consciousness; 16) qualities which appear in “primitive” art; 17) nature manifest­
ing in the artist’s public; 18) universality and then unchangeable art in thought, 
feeling and taste: what is always felt, what all understand immediately; and 19) 
familiar and close, natural as something which any individual can directly enjoy.36
This list in fact constitutes a negative definition of culture: culture is anything 
that is not natural. This shares with our existential approach the point that these 
categories are those used by subjects in real situations, and thus nature is not 
pushed back into the status of some mystic unity. The list can show which kind of 
concepts are leading our behaviour.
Rhizome
Yet there are other theories which are perhaps less conspicuously based 
on the nature metaphor, like the one by Deleuze and Guattari and their famous 
“rhizome” model.37 Their idea was to make a vehement attack against the organic 
tree model proposed by Chomsky. The tree model as binary thinking was adopted 
by linguistics as its basic image, and this was a mistake: a tree is not a rhetoric 
“image” but just a “structure’; Deleuze himself regards all his concepts as images 
and metaphors. For Deleuze, the tree image is totally wrong, since then the idea 
of multiplicity is ignored. “Chomsky’s system has never reached understanding of 
multiplicity”.38 A system of multiplicity is a rhizome; a rhizome as a subterranean 
stem is totally different from roots and radicles... Chomsky’s linguistic models still 
begin at a point S and proceed by dichotomy... semiotic modes of coding (biological, 
political, economic etc.) bring into play not only different regimes of signs but also 
states of things of different status; in Chomsky’s grammar, the categorical symbol 
S that dominates every sentence is more fundamentally a marker of power than 
a syntactic marker. Our criticism of the linguistic models is not that they are too 
abstract but that they are not abstract enough, that they do not reach the abstract 
machine that connects a language to the semantic and pragmatic contents of state­
ment... “A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, 
organization of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social
36 Arthur Lovejoy, Essays in the History o f Ideas (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1948).
37 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis -  London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
38 Ibid., 5.
struggles... There is no ideal speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogene­
ous linguistic community... There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by 
a dominant language”.39
Deleuze’s reasoning has great fascination since it has a prophetic and declara­
tive tone, but what is a “semiotic chain’? What is mother tongue? Certainly not 
S2/S1 i.e., social praxis but something between M2/S2, it is half on the side of 
Moi, unlike other languages learned later. Deleuze swears by multiplicity. There 
are no points or positions in a rhizome — so the theory of “subject positions” is 
also denied here! — such as those in a structure, tree, or root. There are only lines. 
What would Kandinsky have said (Punkt und Linie zu Fläche)? We do not have 
units, only multiplicities.40 There is deterritorialisation insofar as multiplicities 
are defined from outside. A rhizome may be shattered at a given spot but it will 
start again. The rhizome makes a reference to DNA whose evolutionary schemas 
would no longer follow models of arborescent descent. There is thus a metaphorical 
link to biology, one might nowadays even speak of nanotechnology whose most 
fervent defenders see it as a new universal system for resolving all the problems 
of mankind, from technology to ecology. Another cultural object which Deleuze 
“rhizomizes” is the book. The book means deterritorialisation of the world, but the 
world then reterritorializes the book. Follow the plants, Deleuze’s sermon goes on: 
“Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialisation...”.41 Could 
this be also a political slogan, as has been shown by the recent events in Europe? 
Make a map, not a tracing! This advice was once followed by a semiotician trying 
to reach the Imatra semiotic congress by train from Helsinki. He forgot to change 
mid-way and then called from other side of the country to the congress. “Why 
are you there and not here?”, he was asked. “The map was wrong”, he answered.
Let us now ask how this would be linked to the existential theory of culture. 
It is hard to believe that any subject would at all times live in his or her culture as 
if it were a rhizome. Very quickly, even when moved to a totally strange environ­
ment, a subject constitutes his own Umwelt by identifying small signs around him, 
by gradually creating his own territory. The first cultural act is to occupy a space, 
says Corbusier. It is impossible to make a theory of ego, Moi/Soi, subjectivity, 
based upon such a rhizomatic experience. It certainly reflects a quite postmodern 
anguish amidst the multiplicity of “choices” at an American supermarket, or in 
a market-oriented, consumption- and media-driven, internet society in general. All 
is available and at the same time nothing, since without orientation by a transcen­
dental ego providing the concrete subject with the criteria of selection, judgement, 
evaluation and comparison, one is indeed lost in a rhizomatic desert amidst our 
globalized world.
39 Ibid, 6-7.
40 Ibid, 8.
41 Ibid, 11.
Yet even Deleuze has an aspiration towards that deeper level while talking 
about machining assemblages, making the unfolding of semiotic chains possible. 
However, this theory is certainly not existential in that it denies the subject any 
possibility of agency as proposed in the British theory. Deleuze states: “A rhizome 
has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, 
intermezzo... Where are you going? Where are you coming from? What are you 
heading for? These are totally useless questions”.42 If such fundamental questions 
are forbidden in his model, we cannot take his theory as a model for an existential 
theory of culture. Rather, it reflects the feeling of being lost amidst a huge me­
tropolis, something like a Western traveller in Tokyo, without any knowledge of 
their mother tongue, without any map, without any familiar signs.
Nevertheless, later Deleuze has the courage to borrow unscrupulously from 
linguistics the idea of articulation, particularly double articulation, and he claims 
that the entire organism must be considered in relation to double articulation.43 
Then his system even reaches theology: “A stratum always has a dimension of the 
expressible... to express is always to sing the glory of God. Every stratum is a judge­
ment of God; not only do plants and animals ...sign or express themselves, but so 
do rocks and even rivers, every stratified on earth. The first articulation concerns 
content, the second expression”.44 Thank God there is no mistake here regarding the 
theory of André Martinet, and this may contain echoes of Lévi-Strauss who shared 
with Deleuze the same belief in the stratification of reality: geology, Marxism and 
psychoanalysis, all of these portrayed stratified entities. Otherwise this view is not 
far from that of Oswald Spengler. So at least on the discursive level, the return of 
the speculative theory seems possible in contemporary debates!
Zemic/Zetic
Now we might go further and ponder whether our Zemic model with 
its internal shift from Moi to Soi would mean the same as the shift from biology to 
psychology, and, moreover, to sociology and then to anthropology, or simply from 
nature to culture. To what extent is the Zemic model a model of an “organism”, 
organic growth, Bildung, culture in the sense of cultivation? To what extent does 
it involve the Ruskinian idea of education or the principle of Kultur in the sense 
of Kunsterziehung proposed by J. Langbehn, one of the founders of the aesthetic 
education movement, a long time ago (1897)? There have been efforts to apply it 
also to communities — for example, by Markku Sormunen — but to what extent 
could we take “culture” as just a more extensive Zemic construction?
42 Ibid, 25.
43 Ibid, 41.
44 Ibid, 42.
If yes, what could it mean to talk about Ml, or the “body’s” primal corporeal­
ity, the kinetic movement of a social group or collectivity — except in Wagnerian 
operas where the chorus expresses this aspect magnificently — I refer, for instance, 
to the chorus in M astersingers or in Parsifal. In the latter when the “bodies” of the 
knights have enjoyed their wine and bread, they are refreshed and believe again in 
their community, and turn again to being courageous. To what extent can we speak 
of the identity of a group? With certainty and without artistic metaphors? Within 
the Durkheimian organic or mechanical solidarity, to what extent can we talk about 
the social practices of a group? And to do so even better than when talking about an 
individual subject? And to what extent are there collective values and norms, even 
better than for single persons? Yet immediately other challenges rise up, such as the 
question: what is the relationship of these two Zemic models? Or is the collective 
Zemic rather a Zetic, i.e. external, model to a single subject? Is the subject always 
to be considered outside of his group, clan, tribe, sect, nation, community? How 
does an individual Zemic entity communicate with its collective Zemic group? If 
the collective Zemic group sends a message dealing with values and norms, i.e. SI, 
in which mode does the individual Zemic react? By his body? By his person? By 
his profession and role? By his individual values which may differ from the group 
values? All combinations are possible. Could these communications or shifts among 
the modes be portrayed, for instance, by modal analysis in the Greimasian sense, 
as “will, know, can”, etc. For instance, when a subject is unable to realize a rule in 
his Ml or M2 because he is lacking the modalities of “know” and “can’?
However, we may also note here that between the individual Zemic and the 
collective Zemic there is a mediation, namely the dialogue between two individual 
Zemic subjects. This is the theory proposed by Mikhail Bakhtin, in his ideas on 
dialogue. Every subjects grows, lives and develops in dialogues with other members 
of the group Zemic class. What happens at this level? Lévi-Strauss claims: Qui dit 
homme dit language et qui d it langage dit société. Thus we may again adopt the 
Saussurean model of dialogue, of two Zemic worlds encountering each other: Mr. 
A transmitting signs to Mr. B and the latter responding. Then we might say that 
the theory of culture, as well as the existential one, must include this aspect of 
communality and step out of its solipsistic framework.
Transfer
The dialogue model could also function well on the cultural level. This 
becomes clear when we deal with so-called cultural transfers among different cul­
tures, i.e. two collective Zemic units. A fine study about such an issue is the one by 
Michel Espagne, Les transferts culturels franco-allem ands.45 It is based on the
45 Michel Espagne, Les transferts culturels franco-allemands (Paris: PUF, 1999).
idea of national culture: France and Germany had to have first the idea of their 
almost organic nature as cultures before any exchange, in any form, was possible. 
In this sense there had to exist what Benedict Anderson has called “Imagined 
communities”. For his theory the national culture is a typical case of an imaginary 
collectivity which does not exist anywhere else than in the minds of certain groups. 
This was made possible in Europe technically by printing books. By reading books 
one could be in touch with huge communities without ever meeting them face to 
face. In a certain sense, then, the nation is a “transcendental entity’; it is something 
which is absent but present in our minds. This principal absence does not exclude 
its strong emotional impact and force when ideas such as brotherhood etc., are 
linked. People are then ready to die for it, as one can still see on any TV news in 
our time. The nation thus would appear to be a typical cultural Zetic formation, 
i.e. it is never Zemic as such, but can of course become Zemic any time when it 
is actualized in the Dasein of the members of a group. Yet, in the case discussed 
by Michel Espagne, that of France-Germany, the claim made is that the easi­
est model for studying such transfers is the model of communication. However, 
here we need to point out as a commentary the view expressed by Jaan Valsiner 
who, when talking about cultural transfers, argues that the unidirectional scheme 
should be replaced by a bi- or multidirectional or mutually constructive scheme. 
All participants of the cultural transfer actively transform the cultural message. 
Thus France influences Germany, Germany influences France, and even “third” 
members are included, such as England or Russia.46
However, in the chapter Au-dela du com paratism e Espagne discusses several 
principles of such issues which are interesting when juxtaposing two collective 
Zemic entities, such as European neighbour nations.47 First among them is that 
comparison presupposes cultural areas close enough to enable one to pass over 
the specificities by applying abstract categories. The main problem is then, as 
pointed out by Espagne, who does the observing! Very often one only compares 
oneself to others. For instance, the notion of Bildung in education has, for Ger­
mans, almost a metaphysical meaning, whereas Frenchmen and Englishmen do 
not even understand what is involved. Often comparison takes place between the 
synchronic parallels of two cultures, without noting their chronologies. History 
is easily forgotten. Comparatism opposes social groups (i.e., two S2’s) instead of 
emphasizing acculturation mechanisms. Comparisons are for grounding territo­
ries. They concern objects (Zetic units) thought to express identities, for instance 
national anthems. Comparison can exaggerate differences instead of convergences. 
Very often a scholar’s comparison of two nations only strengthens their national­
isms. I have earlier, in my postcolonial theory, noted that nationalism emerges as 
a reaction against a threat from another nation, perhaps imagined, i.e. a reaction
46 Valsiner, Culture, 36.
47 Espagne, Les transferts, 35-49.
against an attempt at subordination and colonization. Then such an imagined 
community might have only a negative role and not be considered an authentic 
phenomenon growing from the SI values of a group as such.
For instance, a nation may need to defend some totally physical qualities of Ml. 
To give an example, oriental people cannot stand the smell of soured milk while 
Westerners do not notice such a smell because they use milk products. Someone 
said that he can immediately distinguish a Finn in a Parisian street by how he 
walks. When I wore a fur cap in the winter of Minnesota people admired it but 
thought it was sign of being a Russian. In such a case a Zetic sign represents the 
culture. Music, food, clothes, all these of course belong to such markers. Yet some 
Zetic units and behaviours are elevated to such a high status of their culture that 
they are called cultural heritages. They constitute foregrounded, linguistically 
marked, cultural Zetic units which have to be remembered, preserved, maintained, 
fostered, in some cases even renewed. The carriers of such heritages again apply 
their Zemic profiles to do so.
Alien-psychic
It is now time to return once again to transcendence. This ambiguous 
concept undoubtedly also has a social interpretation, such as that by Alfred Schiitz 
and Thomas Luckmann in their The Structures o f the Life-World,48 representing 
the so-called understanding sociology, Verstehende Soziologie. They give the 
notion quite an empirical and colloquial meaning by distinguishing three types 
of “transcendencies’: small, middle and major. “Transcendental” simply means 
anything which is absent. However, Alfred Schiitz presents quite profound views 
on the notion in his treatise Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Weltf* He deals 
there with the philosophical problem of alien-psychic or Fremdseelig. In this 
view, the only certain thing is my own stream of consciousness, Erlebnisstrom. 
He distinguishes two types of intentional experiences or acts: those whose inten­
tional objects are within the same stream of experiences as oneself. So we might 
say - such intentional acts which take place within our Zemic model - let us say, 
when one’s M l addresses M2 or SI is “talking” to M2 or S2. In semiotics, this would 
be called autocommunication. On the other hand, those intentional experiences 
which are not there are transcendentally directed, for instance acts directed to­
wards intentional experiences of other “Ich’s” or T s ”. Not only are transcendences 
intentional acts directed to others, but transcendent are, rather, all experiences 
of the bodies of other egos, and even of my own body. So, what kinds of acts are 
those directed towards the other’s experiences? It means that one Zemic subject
48 Alfred Schütz, Strukturen der Lebenswelt. Band I  (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994).
49 Schütz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993).
listens to another, and receives that person’s signs and messages, leading us into 
quite “existential” questions.
Arno Münster has noted in his study Le principe dialogique: De la réflexion 
monologique vers la pro-flexion inter subjective,50 that, quoting Martin Buber: 
“Only You, only the discovery of You, leads me to take consciousness of myself’. 
So it is in encountering the alien-psychic that we become existential subjects 
ourselves. As Schütz puts it: “this means that You and Me exist simultaneously, 
we coexist”. And coexistence means co-temporaneity, participating to the same 
duration. We share the same Bergsonian temps de durée, one might add. Nowhere 
else does this become so clear as when playing together with other musicians. An 
ensemble of three, four, five or more musicians” “bodies” must become like one 
Zemic entity in order to be able to produce in a certain spatiotemporal network 
a cultural artifact which is a composition, i.e. a particular Zetic entity, by reacting 
to and interpreting its embedded Ml, M2, S2 and SI modes.
Conclusion
Next we have to turn back and ask ourselves whether we were able to 
answer the questions posed at the beginning. Has such a thing as an “existential se- 
miotic cultural theory” emerged from the previous observations and reflections? We 
might at least gather here the essential principles of such an ambitious enterprise:
1) The new notion which the ESC theory tries to launch is transcendence;
2) The ESC theory is an attempt to see and analyse issues from the inside, 
using a model called Zemic which refers to four modes of Being;
3) Agency: behind the theory is the idea of a subject as a transcendental ego, 
who is capable of pursuing acts, making choices and enjoying freedom;
4) The theory of ESC can be tested by empirical cases of cultural life and his­
tory such as studies in cultural heritage;
5) The theory is non-deterministic;
6) There is a “linguistic turn”, in the sense that a new metalanguage is elabo­
rated to deal with transcultural, supra-rational and metacultural issues;
7) Formal language is used to some extent, stemming from the semiotic square, 
deontic logic and the grammar of modalities;
8) The appropriate philosophical style is that of the continental and speculative 
theory, yet the ESC theory is not a regress in the history of philosophy;
9) ESC theory is non-reductionist, i.e. it emphasizes the phenomena as such.
50 Arno Münster, Le principe dialogique. De la réflexion monologique vers la pro-flexion 
intersubjective (Paris: Kimé, 1997), 39.
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